What Periods Can Be Counted Towards Judicial Service in Ukraine?

After retiring from judicial office, a judge discovered that, in his opinion, the amount of remuneration associated with his length of judicial service had been calculated incorrectly. In particular, the period of his military service in Afghanistan and the period during which he studied at a law university had not been included in his length of service as a judge.

The former judge argued that these periods should be included in his judicial service record and should therefore affect the amount of the monthly supplement for length of service. He applied to the State Judicial Administration of Ukraine requesting that the relevant periods be counted, but his request was refused.

The former judge subsequently challenged the refusal before the court. He argued that, under the special legislation applicable to judges, both his military service in Afghanistan and his period of legal education should be included in the service record relevant to his judicial benefits.

The Supreme Court examined the legislation governing the calculation of judicial service. An important issue was whether the disputed periods could be treated as special service as a judge, rather than merely as part of the claimant’s general employment record.

With regard to the period of study at a law university, the Court concluded that the applicable legislation did not provide sufficient legal grounds for including that period in the claimant’s length of service as a judge. Consequently, the claim seeking recognition of the period of university study as judicial service could not be upheld.

The case also illustrates an important distinction between general employment record and special judicial service.

A person’s general employment record may include different periods of work in different occupations and positions. For example, two years of employment as a courier, five years as an assistant judge and ten years as a judge may form part of the person’s overall employment history.

Such periods may be relevant when determining certain social and pension rights, including, where provided by law, the calculation of a retired judge’s monthly lifetime allowance.

However, special judicial service is a separate legal concept. It primarily includes periods during which a person actually held judicial office, together with other periods that legislation expressly permits to be counted towards the length of service as a judge.

This distinction is particularly important when calculating benefits that depend specifically on the number of years of judicial service, such as a supplement for length of service. A period that forms part of a person’s general employment history does not automatically qualify as special judicial service.

The Court also examined the claimant’s military service in Afghanistan. It concluded that the relevant military service could be taken into account as part of his general service record under the rules applicable to such service.

However, this did not mean that the same period automatically constituted service as a judge for the purpose of calculating the judicial supplement for length of service.

Accordingly, the period of military service in Afghanistan could affect rights for which the general service record was relevant, but it did not provide grounds for increasing the judicial remuneration component that depended specifically on the length of service in judicial office.

The practical significance of this legal position is that not every period included in a person’s general employment or service record can be counted as special judicial service. The inclusion of a particular period in the length of service as a judge requires a specific legal basis.

Therefore, when calculating the remuneration or monthly lifetime allowance of a retired judge, it is necessary to distinguish carefully between general employment record, judicial service and other periods that legislation expressly permits to be included for a particular type of payment.